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Increased polarization in politics reduces voter turnout
As the government shutdown in October showed, the U.S. is currently in a period of deep political
division. Using data collected from in dozens of U.S. Senate races between 1996 and 2006, and
50 U.S. House races in 2006, Jon Rogowski examines the effect of this partisan polarization on
electoral behaviors. His results suggest that increasing policy differences between candidates
significantly reduces voter turnout, particularly among citizens with lower levels of education and
political knowledge.
As the recent congressional debates over the federal budget and debt limit underscore,
contemporary American politics can hardly be discussed without some reference to partisan polarization. As
others have pointed out ( for example here, here, here, and here), estimates based on congressional roll call
voting patterns show that the national parties are more ideologically distinct than they have ever been.
Generations of scholars and observers might agree that this development is a good thing for American
democracy. More than sixty years ago, the American Political Science Association’s Committee on Political Parties
issued a report in which they urged the two major policies to better distinguish themselves and therefore present
the public with a “true choice” on the major issues of the day. Decades earlier, Woodrow Wilson, James Bryce,
and others expressed similar views, arguing that “the two parties so far agree that we cannot now speak of any
conflict of principles.” As justification for their recommendations, the APSA committee argued that ideologically
distinct parties would increase the public’s involvement in the democratic process and enable them to hold parties
more accountable for their performance in office.
On the latter question, David Jones finds that increased
polarization in Congress contributes to greater electoral
accountability for congressional performance. But
conclusions about how party polarization has affected the
mass public have been decidedly more mixed. Work by
Marc Hetherington and Matthew Levendusky suggests that
polarization improves citizen decision-making by making it
easier for voters to choose the party or candidate whose
policy platform best reflects their own beliefs, while recent
work by Jamie Druckman, Erik Peterson, and Rune Slothuus
finds that elite polarization reduces the quality of the public’s
opinions. Alan Abramowitz and Kyle Saunders further
conclude that party polarization has increased the public’s
political engagement and voter turnout, but Morris Fiorina
argues that polarization has led much of the public to
withdraw from politics. Given these conflicting findings, what
can we infer about how the choices offered on Election Day
affect the public’s willingness to participate in the exercise of
collective choice?
To make headway on answering this question, and thereby
test a key argument presented by responsible party
theorists, I examine how the nature of the choice between
competing candidates affects voter turnout. Using data
collected by Project Vote Smart, I generate estimates of the
spatial locations of candidates in dozens of U.S. Senate races between 1996 and 2006, and 50 U.S. House races
in 2006. Similar to how estimates such as DW-NOMINATE characterize the roll call voting behavior of members of
Congress, these estimates I generate from the Vote Smart surveys characterize the ideological locations of the
candidates running for office. Importantly, the Vote Smart data contain information on the campaign platforms
chosen by both winning and losing candidates. I then characterize the level of ideological divergence between the
candidates in a given race by taking the difference in the candidates’ estimates. For instance, if the Democratic
candidate’s platform estimate is -1, and the Republican candidate’s platform estimate is +1, the level of candidate
divergence is 2 units. As shown in Figure 1 below, the level of ideological divergence varies greatly; while some
pairs of candidates choose platforms that are nearly convergent, other pairs of candidates run on campaign
platforms that are highly dissimilar.
Figure 1 – Candidate Platforms and Ideological Divergence
Note: The circles represent the point estimates for each candidate’s platform, and the
horizontal lines are the 95% credible intervals from the posterior distribution. Republicans
are shown in red, and Democrats are shown in blue. The dashed lines display the mean
platform estimates.
I use two sets of individual-level data to examine how these levels of ideological divergence affect citizens’ turnout
decisions. I merge the estimates of Senate divergence with data from the November Voting Supplements to the
Current Population Study, conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and the estimates of divergence in House
elections with the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study.
My main finding is that, rather than stimulate political participation, increasing policy differences between
candidates significantly reduces voter turnout. Across both the Senate and House races, I estimate that citizens in
districts in which the candidates adopted clearly distinct sets of policy positions were about five percentage points
less likely to vote than citizens in districts where the candidates’ policy differences were not as substantial. These
results hold up even while accounting for a wide range of demographic, political, and contextual factors and using
a variety of alternative model specifications and statistical techniques.
Second, I argue that ideological divergence is likely to have heterogeneous effects across individuals, as not all
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citizens respond equally to ideological stimuli. Some citizens have greater tolerance for political conflict than
others. In particular, citizens with higher levels of political sophistication may be better able to look beyond the fact
of conflict, and thus understand what is at stake in the choice between candidates. Consistent with this
explanation, I find that the relationship between ideological divergence and turnout is driven primarily by the
demobilization of citizens with lower levels of education and political knowledge. Importantly, I do not find support
for other alternative explanations, including the withdrawal of ideological moderates, abstention due to ideological
alienation, decreased participation among Independents, decreases in political interest, or variation in the
effectiveness of mobilization.
These findings give rise to
something of a paradox: though
clearly defined differences on
policy grounds may increase the
relevance of programmatic
differences for electoral decision-
making and increase the stakes
associated with election
outcomes, as previous scholars
argue, increased ideological
conflict reduces participation in
the exercise of collective choice.
Moreover, the findings imply that
ideological conflict in elections
does not intensify divisions
between voters and nonvoters on the basis of ideology or partisanship. Instead, political sophistication appears to
be the relevant characteristic that distinguishes voters from nonvoters. Not all citizens develop or apply ideological
principles in the same way, and when the relevance of ideology increases for electoral decision-making, citizens
who appear less likely to use ideological considerations to guide their ballot choices instead are more likely to stay
at home. And finally, my research demonstrates that the effects of ideological conflict and, perhaps, party
polarization more generally are likely to have more widespread effects than previous scholarship (e.g., Layman
and Carsey 2002; Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2012) anticipated.
This article is based on the paper, “Electoral Choice, Ideological Conflict, and Political Participation” which was
published in the American Journal of Political Science in October 2013.
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